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ABOUT THE PROJECT
Begun in late 2012, this two-year project will 
explore and promote the ways that Canada and 
Australia can enhance their security cooperation 
and contribute to more stable regional security 
environments and governance mechanisms in the 
Asia-Pacific region.
The region has become an increasingly important 
area for the Canadian government’s international 
economic priorities. Regional security and stability 
are prerequisites to achieving these priorities, and 
given Australia’s tremendous success engaging 
with Asia-Pacific countries from trade and 
investment through to security, there is no better 
partner for Canada’s own broader engagement in 
the region.
CIGI and ASPI will explore the possibilities 
for Canadian and Australian cooperation in 
promoting strengthened security and regional 
governance in the Asia-Pacific. It will cover 
areas such as strategic policy, cooperation in 
foreign policy and defence initiatives, and closer 
military-to-military ties. The project will be led by 
Australian and Canadian co-chairs, advised by a 
binational council of prominent individuals and 
officials. The project’s research will contribute to 
discussions at the February 2014 Australia-Canada 
Economic Leadership Forum in Melbourne. The 
resulting report will be presented later in 2014 to 
both Australian and Canadian governments.
As an additional element, CIGI is working closely 
with two Korean partners — the Seoul Forum 
for International Affairs and the Asan Institute 
for Policy Studies — which will host one of the 
two regional workshops that form part of the 
project. It is expected that this workshop will also 
give important insights into the possibilities of 
Korean engagement with Canada and Australia in 
ongoing cooperation in the security domain.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper examines the prospect and utility of closer 
defence cooperation for both Canada and Australia. 
It reflects on commonalities and like-mindedness, 
particularly as they concern regional security and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific. Forward-looking measures 
are presented for Canadian and Australian defence 
policy makers to capitalize on each other’s strengths 
and similarities. A visionary understanding of the two 
countries’ shared heritage and common interests is 
called for, but Canada has to demonstrate how serious 
it is about engagement in the region. Cooperation could 
enhance both countries’ ability to engage in the region, 
their mutual defence capabilities and their engagement 
with the great powers. With this in mind, closer bilateral 
engagement should be considered in three areas: 
bolstering regional engagement, cost-saving measures 
and enhancing engagement with great powers.
WHY CLOSER COLLABORATION?
Australia and Canada have an enduring interest in 
making a positive ongoing contribution to security and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific.1 They’re equidistant from the 
strategic hotspots of Northeast Asia (Figure  1). They’re 
close, even intimate, treaty allies of the United States 
and supporters of the rules-based global order known 
as the Pax Americana established in the aftermath of 
World War  II, most visibly through institutions such as 
the United Nations and backed by US military power. 
They also have similarly sized and structured armed 
forces, employing uncannily comparable equipment and 
repeatedly contemplating many of the same operational 
deployments and equipment acquisition decisions, 
ranging from fighter aircraft to armoured vehicles, 
weapons and communications systems, warships and 
submarines.2 For a long time, both countries’ armed 
forces have tended to follow trends initiated from Britain 
or the United States. But increasingly, with Britain and the 
United States taking a more constrained role in security 
affairs, Canadian and Australian officials are finding 
themselves the more vocal of the traditional English-
speaking security partners. Finding themselves agreeing 
on a number of issues has caught some by surprise. Yet 
they have long had much in common, and the shared 
understanding and altered circumstances are pointing to 
a renewed interest in collaboration and cross-pollination 
to enhance regional security and stability. 
1 For the significance of this term, see Rory Medcalf (2012), Pivoting the 
Map: Australia’s Indo-Pacific System, Centre of Gravity series, Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National 
University, Canberra, November.
2 This is argued in Blaxland (2006).
Like Australia, Canada has a significant and distinctive 
legacy of involvement in the security affairs of the Indo-
Pacific, although for many years that legacy has been 
obscured by Canada’s focus on trans-Atlantic security ties 
through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Both have an enduring obligation, through the United 
Nations, to the defence of South Korea.
With Northeast Asian trade booming, Canada’s economic 
centre of gravity has been shifting westward toward the 
“Far East.” With a pipeline from Alberta to Canada’s 
west coast being considered, trade with Asia is expected 
to jump, generating a natural lobby for even greater 
engagement. Together with mounting security concerns, 
and with its closest security and trade partner, the United 
States, undertaking a “pivot” or “rebalancing” toward 
Asia, there is legitimate renewed Canadian interest in 
security engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, which has 
often been seen more as Australia’s than Canada’s domain 
when it comes to defence and security.3
From Australia’s perspective, concern remains that the 
Canadian government has shown little real interest in 
“pivoting” to the Pacific in this way. Such a move would 
take considerable political capital to effect, and the current 
Canadian government under Stephen Harper has tended 
to direct much of its “strategic” thought inwards, focussing 
on ensuring short- to medium-term political gain.
Yet Canada’s renewed focus, if it proves to be a genuine and 
sustained one, is of intrinsic interest to Australia, and carries 
significant policy implications. A visionary understanding 
of the two countries’ shared heritage and common interests 
is called for. Both countries also see security ties with the 
US as enduring and recognize the need to think creatively 
in a period of constraint about options for strengthening 
alliance ties with the US and bilateral ties with a range of 
Asian powers, notably including China. At the same time, 
both Canada and Australia are middle powers with limited 
industrial capacity and ability to launch and sustain major 
capital works, such as ship or submarine building. Latent 
efficiencies and savings are ripe for harvest through 
collaboration. Both countries also have a parochial view 
of their place in the world and of each other’s relevance to 
and role in Indo-Pacific security affairs.
A SHARED LEGACY
As Australia and Canada contemplate the implications, it 
is worth reflecting on their shared experiences in the Indo-
Pacific. Both fought in the Boer War, World War I, World 
War II and the Korean War.
3 See the proceedings of the “Canada in the Pacific Century” conference, 
September 2012, available at www.ceocouncil.ca/pacific/conference and 
www.nsi-ins.ca/newsroom/a-pivot-to-asia-canadas-real-globalization/. 
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Figure 1: The Pacific Rim
Source: Blaxland, 2006.
Combatants from both countries are commemorated for 
their sacrifice at Commonwealth war graves in Myanmar, 
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere.4 Canadians 
lost a whole brigade in the defence of Hong Kong in 
December 1941, while Australians lost a division of two 
brigades in the defence of Singapore in February 1942. The 
losses occurred with little forethought about improving 
their prospects through allied collaboration. Thereafter, 
Canadian forces engaged in an amphibious operation, 
storming ashore at Kiska Island in the Aleutians (northeast 
of Japan), and contemplated sending one or two combat 
divisions to fight in the Pacific alongside the Australians.5
As the war progressed, both were left with little voice in 
the direction of grand strategy (Blaxland, 2006: 83). In the 
end, the Canadians sent a special wireless battalion, which 
4  Thirty-three Australians are buried alongside Canadians, Britons, 
Indians and Dutch at Hong Kong’s Sai Wan Commonwealth War 
Cemetery; the names of 181 Canadian airmen are inscribed in the 
Singapore Memorial.
5  The idea was floated by Major General V. W. Odlum, Canada’s High 
Commissioner to Australia, in Canberra in January 1942.
operated out of Darwin. But it was a secret organization, so 
few knew about this Canadian contribution to Australia, 
even though the bonds established then in the realm of 
special intelligence endure to this day.6
Afterwards, Canada contributed a brigade-sized land 
force plus naval and air elements during the Korean War, 
fighting alongside Australians and together inflicting a 
setback on the enemy at the Battle of Kapyong in 1951.
During the Vietnam War, Canada was the principal 
Western country sending monitors to Vietnam to work 
with the International Commission for Supervision and 
Control, largely as a favour to the US — and in a manner 
that faintly echoed Australia’s contribution alongside the 
Americans. Later, Canadians and Australians bumped 
into each other on UN peacekeeping missions around the 
globe. In 1999, Canada sent an infantry company with air 
and sea logistic support to participate in the International 
6  See Jean Bou (2012), MacArthur’s Secret Bureau: The Story of the Central 
Bureau, General MacArthur’s Signals Intelligence Organisation, Loftus: 
Australian Military History Publications.
CLOSER AUSTRALIA-CANADA DEFENCE COOPERATION? 
 
JOHN BLAXLAND • 7
Force East Timor (INTERFET). Canada and Australia 
contributed forces to the invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001, but short of a fresh UN mandate, Canadian Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien balked at participating in Iraq in 
2003 — despite, like Australia, having embedded officers 
alongside their US counterparts. Interestingly, this was a 
move that then opposition leader Simon Crean proposed 
in Australia as well.
Since then, Canada has undertaken major combat 
operations in the Afghan province of Kandahar, adjacent 
to the Australians in Oruzgan, leading the fight against 
the Taliban and suffering greater casualties. As a NATO 
member, Canada quietly but forcefully advocated on 
Australia’s behalf for greater access and influence on 
policy and strategy deliberations within the organization. 
Additionally, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal 
Australian Navy (RAN) ships have worked alongside in 
the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean for over two decades.
All these events happened on short notice, with little 
time to coordinate Canadian and Australian policy or 
plans, but they demonstrate the congruence in the two 
countries’ strategic outlooks for more than a century. Few 
appreciate how much Canada has done for Australia or 
how significant and enduring are the understated ties 
between these two former British colonies.
Canada has demonstrated that it genuinely cares about 
security in the Indo-Pacific region. If it now appears ready 
to bolster its credentials as a serious actor there, it should 
consider closer engagement, particularly with Australia 
and the United States, but also with other Asian powers, 
including China.
Canada’s and Australia’s fixations on ties with the 
superpower and an apparent disregard for their enduring 
common security interests have sometimes obscured the 
utility of comparing and contrasting or sharing notes and 
experiences with each other, or exploring opportunities 
for mutually beneficial collaboration. And yet there’s an 
enduring commonality between these two uncannily 
like-minded middle powers, steeped in shared histories, 
institutions, cultures, traditions and interests.
DEEPER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
In Australia, few have seen Canada as a serious player in 
the region in recent years, so few have spent much effort 
on expanding collaboration beyond well-established 
multilateral intelligence links and such working-level 
arrangements as the collaborative standardization 
program between the armies of America, Britain, Canada 
and Australia (ABCA), as well as New Zealand.
In the light of Canada’s renewed interest and extensive 
historical commitments and ties to the Indo-Pacific, 
Australian skepticism needs to be overcome. A fresh look 
at Canada’s significance to shared security objectives is 
required, as both nations seek to enhance regional security 
and stability to facilitate their own expanding trade ties 
and an enduring leadership role for the US, particularly in 
security affairs.
As Canada reconsiders its engagement in the region, 
Canadian and Australian officials should be encouraged 
to read about what it is they have in common and why 
enduring significance continues in the ties between these 
strategic cousins. Officers on both sides need to lift their 
vision to have a clearer understanding of the utility of 
collaboration and the missed opportunities of the past. 
Reflecting on experiences with INTERFET, for example, 
might provide some useful pointers for future engagement. 
INTERFET involved the rapid deployment of troops, 
working alongside other coalition partners, including 
many Southeast Asian countries, employing amphibious 
capabilities, a coalition IT network, intelligence sharing 
and undertaking agreed tasks. 
PROPOSED MEASURES
The following measures should be explored by Canadian 
and Australian defence policy makers to best capitalize 
on each other’s strengths, commonalities and shared 
interests. In particular, cooperation can produce benefits 
in the three key domains: enhancing their ability to engage 
in the region, accruing financial savings and efficiencies, 
and enhancing engagement with the great powers.
BOLSTERING REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT
Defence Attaché Presence
For Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries, among others, appearances sometimes matter 
more than substance; form precedes function. To burnish 
its credentials and open doors in the region, Canada needs 
to bolster security ties by increasing its representational 
defence presence. Canada has a conspicuous shortage 
of defence attachés across Southeast Asia. Increasing the 
number of attachés would help Canada gain greater access 
to local officials and provide a better understanding of local 
circumstances. With greater access and understanding, 
more opportunities for bilateral collaboration could be 
explored.
At the moment, that’s difficult to do. Each Canadian attaché 
covers a handful of countries and spreads their time thinly 
between their areas of responsibility. This leaves them 
poorly placed for proactive engagement beyond offering 
places in English language courses. Similarly, reciprocal 
attaché offices in Ottawa and Canberra need to be staffed 
at the colonel (or equivalent) level and resourced to 
maximize the benefits from enhanced bilateral ties and 
working-level arrangements in the two capitals. 
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ASEAN Engagement
For Australia, its participation in the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements (FPDA) has matched its participation in 
ASEAN-related forums, including the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), particularly in 
various working groups. Australian support for enhanced 
Canadian engagement in such forums should be predicated 
on a commitment from Canada to have a long-term plan 
to engage with the region and to act collaboratively with 
Australia. As an important precursor, Canada must work 
assiduously to gain access to these working groups to 
demonstrate its goodwill and genuine commitment to 
regional engagement. 
Collaborative projects with countries like Indonesia and 
Thailand would likely reap considerable benefits for 
Canada. Canada has compatibilities with the Indonesian 
armed forces inventory, with their Leopard 2 tanks for 
instance, which may present opportunities for shared 
training or related collaboration. Similarly, Thailand 
operates a comparable inventory to items in Canada’s 
arsenal that could provide opportunities for engagement 
and exchanges. Other countries in ASEAN may present 
similar engagement opportunities as well.
Such engagement would also make it much easier for 
Australia to partner with Canada in related regional 
security activities. With a demonstrably increased 
commitment to the region, including through an increased 
military diplomatic presence, the ASEAN member states 
that control the ADMM Plus arrangements would likely 
be willing to see Canada’s membership ambition fulfilled.
Engagement with PACOM
Australia has chosen to work closely with the US Pacific 
Command (PACOM), collaborating on a range of activities 
and exercises, and being invited to assume prominent 
senior appointments with integrated staff; Canada has 
also been invited to participate. But there is scope for an 
even greater focus on the PACOM domain for Ottawa 
policy makers, paralleling its equivalent arrangements in 
NATO. Some will see this as overambitious, but if Canada 
is serious about participating in the Pacific region, such 
engagement must be considered seriously.
Tandem Thrust, a bilateral US-Australian military training 
exercise, may lend itself to Canadian participation as well, 
as has been the case in other exercises. Canada’s inclusion 
would be a worthy reciprocal act for Canada’s advocacy 
on behalf of Australia in NATO forums. Certainly, the 
Australian-led multilateral KAKADU naval exercise 
would be a useful activity for the RCN to join, as would 
Exercise Pitch Black for the Royal Canadian Air Force 
(RCAF).
Participation in the FPDA
Australia is a major participant in the FPDA with Singapore, 
the United Kingdom, Malaysia and New Zealand. Canada 
could conceivably seek observer status in such activities 
and coordinate the timing of participation in other regional 
activities (such as Exercise Cobra Gold, described below) 
to be closely aligned, enabling sequential participation.
Participation in Regional Multilateral Exercises
One useful way to boost regional profile is to participate 
in regional multilateral exercises. Exercise Cobra Gold is 
a bilateral exercise arranged between the United States 
and Thailand. It has become more of a multilateral 
activity in recent years, with observers from Myanmar 
and China included. The exercise also has the active 
participation of air, land and sea components from Japan, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and the 
Republic of Korea. Australia should be seeking to play a 
more prominent role in this exercise in order to burnish 
its regional multilateral ties and to strengthen ties with 
Thailand and other ASEAN participants. Similarly, Canada 
should seek to engage in Cobra Gold.
Collaboration on peacekeeping and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)-related 
components of the exercise would be worth targeting, as 
would the amphibious component, in order to exercise and 
demonstrate the functions of the RAN’s landing helicopter 
docks (LHDs), which are due to become operational soon.
Collaboration with Amphibious Capability Development
As Australia brings its LHDs into service, the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) should invite neighbouring countries 
on board to participate collaboratively in exercises and 
related activities centred on HA/DR scenarios, such as 
Indonesians and other Southeast Asians.7 Canada has 
limited capability in this domain, but as it considers its 
options for the future, it should be invited to participate 
and mix in with the other regional participants.
MUTUAL CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENTS AND 
EFFICIENCIES
Shared Education and Training Exchanges
There may be additional areas where efficiencies and 
savings can be made by sharing undergraduate officer 
education and training. Canadian officer cadets could 
be invited to study at the ADF Academy and Australian 
cadets could be similarly invited to study for a term at 
the Royal Military College of Canada. This has been tried 
before, and participants have benefitted considerably from 
7  See Brendan Taylor (2013), “A New Flank: Fresh Perspectives for 
the Next Defence,” Centre of Gravity White Paper series, Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, April.
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the experience. For mid- and late-career courses, such as 
staff college and defence college, exchanges remain in 
place, having proven to be beneficial. There’s merit in a 
similar arrangement for career-entry level exchanges as 
well.
Exercise Long Look has provided excellent opportunities 
for the cross-pollination of ideas among the armies of 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand. A similar arrangement 
should be considered between Australia and Canada. 
With some creative thinking and ingenuity on both sides, 
cost-efficient ways to do this can be found despite budget 
constraints.
Major Acquisitions
There is also scope for closer collaboration on major 
acquisition projects, including the F-35 and future 
submarine projects. Australia, like Canada, has a significant 
requirement for a non-nuclear-powered submarine 
force that has the range to operate in and around the 
Indo-Pacific. Australia is on the cusp of developing and 
building submarines to replace the six aging Collins class 
submarines built in the 1980s and early 1990s. Canada is 
likewise reflecting on its future submarine options.
The two countries could participate in a collaborative 
project, as they have similar requirements and challenges 
in terms of economies of scale. There is scope for 
efficiencies and commonalities to be explored to ensure 
that the most appropriate platforms are acquired and in 
the best configurations and quantities. Neither country 
can honestly afford to go it alone. A collaborative project 
would likely generate unforeseen benefits.
In considering this approach, managing the expectations 
of both countries’ supplier lobbies and political 
considerations will need to be taken into account. 
Overcoming local resistance will be tough, particularly 
because procurement in both countries touches on local 
defence industry shibboleths and requires visionary and 
long-term commitment. Perhaps a quid pro quo approach 
for such a collaborative project could be found, drawing 
on Canada’s expertise in managing its Arctic.
Capability Development Relating to  
the Arctic and Antarctic
Canada has a wealth of experience in managing its Arctic 
territorial responsibilities. As Australia is giving more 
thought to its responsibilities around the Southern Ocean 
and Antarctic waters, it should give close consideration 
to the RCN’s Arctic/offshore patrol ships, which are 
being designed and built in Canada for operations in the 
Arctic. Australia could benefit considerably from close 
collaboration with Canada as it seeks to further develop 
its ability to operate in and around the Southern Ocean. 
Indigenous Exchanges
Similarly, there are lessons to be learned from the 
Canadian Rangers and its Junior Rangers program. These 
indigenous units that operate in Canada’s far north have 
strong parallels with Australia’s counterpart regional force 
surveillance units, with many lessons to exchange and 
learn from.
Establishing an IT Network for Crisis Coalition Support
As Australia plays an increasingly prominent, if not 
leading, role to facilitate participation in multilateral 
regional activities, a secure coalition IT network is 
required. Such infrastructure was required for INTERFET 
and has been used by coalition partners in the International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. A similar 
configuration should be established by Australia. With 
its impressive IT industry, Canada could be a partner 
in enabling such a network to be established, using the 
amphibious LHDs as a test bed. HA/DR exercises and 
activities are a useful arena in which to use such a system.
Shared Networked and Virtual Training Opportunities
Both the ADF and the Canadian Armed Forces face 
significant budgetary constraints as the Afghanistan 
drawdown nears completion. To maintain honed forces 
and cutting-edge capabilities, maximum use will need 
to be made of simulation, networked IT facilities and 
online training resources. Australia and Canada should 
look toward developing shared online training programs 
where commonalities exist across the three services. Such 
shared arrangements can readily build on the high level 
of compatibility arising from common standards and 
protocols negotiated through forums such as the ABCA 
program.
Shared preparation of syllabus material should be 
considered in areas such as principal warfare officer 
training for RCN and RAN officers, RCAF and Royal 
Australian Air Force aircrew training, and regimental 
officers advanced courses for the Army.
ENHANCING ENGAGEMENT WITH GREAT 
POWERS
Participation Alongside US-led Initiatives
Working alongside the US has enduring importance for 
both Canada and Australia. Whatever collaborative work 
is undertaken between the two countries will probably 
always pale in comparison with the bilateral undertakings 
each has with the US. There are, however, several areas 
where both Canada and Australia could contribute 
alongside the US to collaborative measures aimed at 
enhancing regional security and stability in a way that 
could also help bolster Canada-Australia ties. These 
include the four measures for collaboration between the 
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US and Australia suggested by Thomas Mahnken (2013) 
in a recent blog piece:
• Participation in the integrated intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance network for the 
Western Pacific would aim to improve shared 
understanding to deter hostile action and, if need be, 
to facilitate collective action.
• Cooperation on undersea warfare could include 
ensuring that Canada and Australia acquire 
replacement submarines with high levels of 
interoperability with the US Navy and with each 
other.
• Increased cooperation and interoperability on 
precision munitions would allow for common 
stockpiles for mutual benefit (experience in the 
Korean War is instructive on this point).
• Common investment in high-payoff capabilities in 
collaboration with the US should be considered, and 
may produce effective and efficient research and 
development in an era of greater financial austerity.
Exercises with China
Australian policy makers have consistently claimed that 
nothing is gained from arguing there is a need to choose 
between China as principal economic partner and the 
United States as principal security partner. Painting 
security challenges in such unambiguous terms misses 
the real world’s shades of grey that policy makers grapple 
with. Moreover, in a region where appearances often matter 
more than substance, making declaratory policies in such 
stark terms can have unintended negative consequences. 
Instead, Australia has sought to downplay the differences, 
seeing multilateral collaboration as the best course. With 
this in mind, Australia has engaged with China in a 
variety of bilateral military exercises in recent years, and 
in April this year, then Prime Minister Julia Gillard called 
for trilateral exercises between China, Australia and the 
United States. The preferred areas for collaboration have 
tended to be in the realms of HA/DR, special operations, 
search and rescue, and basic naval activities, including 
passing exercises and naval gunnery. So far, Canada has 
been largely absent from such discussions, distracted by 
other domestic priorities. But as Canada reflects on its 
own demands for a rebalancing towards Asia, there may 
be scope for its participation in similar activities, drawing 
on Australia’s experience. Canada could take part in 
multilateral exercises involving Australia and China, 
and possibly alongside other regional powers, including 
the United States. Creative thinking and a constructive 
approach are required; some are already thinking along 
this line (Manicom, 2013).
Defence-level Arrangements
With so many potential areas for collaboration, information 
sharing and exchanges, there may be scope for the 
establishment of a formal Canadian-Australian Defence 
Arrangement. To date, Canada and Australia have relied 
primarily on US-led multilateral arrangements to provide 
the venue for engagement. But with the United States 
distracted by its own financial concerns and protracted 
domestic political manoeuvrings, there appears to be 
considerable utility in Canada and Australia setting up 
their own bilateral arrangements. This could take the 
form of the bilateral ministerial meeting arrangements 
entered into with Britain (the Australia-United Kingdom 
Ministerial Consultations) and the US (the Australia-
United States Ministerial Consultations) or the strategic 
dialogue arrangements with China, or the “two-plus-two” 
meetings with foreign and defence ministers of South 
Korea.
Whatever Canada decides, with the global centre of gravity 
shifting to the Indo-Pacific, the imperative for Canadian 
engagement can only grow. Better to act now rather than 
to be dragged in later, unprepared.
CONCLUSION
If Canada is serious about engaging in Indo-Pacific 
security, it needs to participate more actively. A number of 
low-cost steps could be taken by Canada and Australia to 
bolster regional security and stability, in turn facilitating 
increased trade and prosperity.
Canada should boost its military and diplomatic presence 
through its defence attaché network and seek participation 
in a number of multilateral exercises and activities. It should 
also be more serious about developing and maintaining 
capabilities that could be employed in the region.
Australians should pay close attention to their Canadian 
counterparts, encouraging and even facilitating greater 
engagement in the Indo-Pacific, recognizing what Canada 
has done for Australia elsewhere and reciprocating in the 
region.
With a demonstration of such resolve, considerable benefit 
may accrue from Australia and Canada working alongside 
to further shared interests in regional security and stability, 
maintaining the rules-based order associated with the Pax 
Americana while encouraging China’s continued peaceful 
rise.
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ACRONYMS
ABCA America, Britain, Canada and Australia
ADF Australian Defence Force
ADMM Plus ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting 
 Plus
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements
HA/DR humanitarian assistance and disaster 
 relief
INTERFET International Force in East Timor
LHD landing helicopter dock
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PACOM US Pacific Command
RAN Royal Australian Navy
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN Royal Canadian Navy
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